Subjective uncertainty is characterized by ambiguity if the decision maker has an imprecise knowledge of the probabilities of payo relevant events. In such an instance, the decision maker's beliefs are better represented by a set of probability functions than by a unique probability function. An ambiguity averse decision maker adjusts his choice on the side of caution in response to his imprecise knowledge of the odds. This paper attempts a (selective) survey of some of the achievements of the research program which has analyzed important economic phenomena using a methodology that departs from standard paradigm by explicitly allowing for ambiguity aversion. We speci®cally look at applications, and implications, of ambiguity aversion in three areas: design of bilateral economic contracts, the trade in ®nancial contracts and ®nancial markets and ®nally, strategic decision making in auctions. We also indicate the possible relevance of these ®ndings to recent research in AI. Ó
Introduction
Savage's theory of subjective expected utility maximization (SEU) [17] is the received paradigm used for modeling decision making under subjective uncertainty in economics. A main implication of SEU is that a decision maker (DM) behaves as if her subjective assessment of likelihoods of uncertain events may be represented precisely by a unique probability distribution. However, experimental evidence ever since Ellsberg [5] has shown this to be a palpably untrue description of behavior under uncertainty. It is often the case that a DM's knowledge about the likelihood of contingent events is consistent with more than one probability distribution. If you were to ask someone about the likelihood of a given eventuality, the answer you typically hear is`between x% and y%',`rather than a crisp,`z%'. But, does how precisely she knows the relevant odds, in¯uence the choice of the typical DM? It does: DMs choose relatively conservatively in situations where information about the odds is ambiguous in the sense that a relatively wide range of odds is consistent with her knowledge. As Ellsberg had observed, imprecise information aected his experimental subjects in a consistent fashion: most preferred to bet on events with unambiguous rather than ambiguous odds (including, Savage himself!). And, he reported, even when faced with the evidence that this was inconsistent with SEU, most stood their ground,``because it seems to them the sensible way to behave''. People adjusting their decisions depending on how well they know the relevant odds and acting with greater wariness the more vague their knowledge, is a commonly observed attitude, and has been named ambiguity aversion.
While there is a vast literature on ambiguity aversion (see [1] ), and indeed of the many other departures from SEU, that convincingly establish their importance in laboratory settings, this work has had little impact on the way that economics is done. In large part this is because there have been few demonstrations that economically important phenomena can be understood by using, and only using, models other than the standard one (SEU). The formidable recent advances in formulating a very`workable' analytical framework for handling ambiguity aversion have availed us with a wonderful opportunity of obtaining such demonstrations. And indeed, recent times have seen a growing research program which has availed itself of this opportunity. This paper surveys some of the achievements of this research program. We speci®cally look at applications, and implications, of ambiguity aversion in three areas: design of bilateral economic contracts, the trade in ®nancial markets and strategic decision making in auctions.
As is perhaps well known to readers of this journal, reasoning under uncertainty when the knowledge of odds is imprecise is integral to important problems of AI, including medical diagnosis, machine diagnosis, vision, robotics and natural language understanding. Very often in such contexts, databases are incomplete (or`coarse') and the`hard' evidence at hand may be compatible with multiple (probabilistic) beliefs and`expert opinions'. Hence, in such situations`input' required to form adequate Bayesian priors are not available and closed sets of probabilities are a natural tool for quantifying the state of prior belief or assessment. And indeed, this insight, developed from ideas in AI research, inspires at least one understanding of the foundations of the theory of ambiguity aversion in economic situations. 1 More recently, a signi®cant strand of AI research, led by Michael Wellman, has argued that economic or market-based systems provide the necessary extensions to form a general tool for designing distributed intelligent decision making under uncertainty in multi-agent systems [20, 21] . For instance, climate control in large buildings is an application area where multi-agent systems, and marketoriented programming in particular, have been reported to be very successful. Following an earlier work by Hanson [8] , who ®rst proposed in the context of multi-agent systems the idea that markets in uncertain propositions can be used to coordinate decentralized behavior, Pennock and Wellman [14] have shown how securities markets can serve to aggregate beliefs of multiple agents with possibly divergent information sources (see also the work of Nau and others at Duke on this topic at http://cl26.fuqua.duke.edu/admin/it/test_faculty/ bob_level1.htm). In related research, Wellman and his associates have embarked on an innovative and ambitious investigation of the application of the principles of auction design, developed by economists using tools of game theory, to the design of multi-agent systems (see http://ai.eecs.umich.edu/people/wellman/publications.html#anchor848534 and http://auction.eecs.umich. edu/). Curiously enough, this recent research invoking the ideas of markets and strategic behavior to the design of multi-agent systems does not seem to apply the ideas from the AI research referred to earlier, namely, that closed sets of probabilities are a natural way of quantifying knowledge bases in contexts of interest. A contribution of the present survey would be to alert those involved in the new research initiative to the ®ndings that the nature and outcomes of market interaction and strategic behavior in auctions can change very dramatically if one admits a model of reasoning under uncertainty that incorporates quali®cations which are quite compelling in the context of incomplete databases. Since such considerations prompt a change in the understanding of the functioning and design of economic institutions, it may be fruitful to explore analogous questions in future research in the design of multi-agent systems.
The pioneering axiomatic foundations of the principal formal ideas of the most widely used models of ambiguity aversion were provided in contributions by Gilboa and Schmeidler, and Schmeidler [7, 18] . While the technical details of the formal models of decision making under ambiguity aversion used in the various applications vary, the broad intuitive content may be stated as follows. 1 For instance, Ghirardato and Mukerji [6, 10] point out how the DM's awareness that the precise implication of some contingencies if inevitably left unforeseen, may lead to beliefs that have a belief function [3, 19] representation. The papers explain the Choquet decision rule as à procedurally rational' agent's means of`handicapping' the evaluation of an act to the extent the estimate of its`expected performance' is adversely aected by his imprecise knowledge of the odds.
Suppose an agent's subjective knowledge about the likelihood of contingent events is consistent with more than one probability distribution, and further that, what the agent knows does not inform him of a precise (second-order) probability distribution over the set of`possible' probabilities, we say then that the agent's beliefs about contingent events are characterized by ambiguity. If ambiguous, 2 the agent's beliefs are captured not by a unique probability distribution in the standard Bayesian fashion but instead by a set of probabilities. Thus not only is the particular outcome of an act uncertain but also the expected payo of the action, since the payo may be measured with respect to more than one probability. An agent's ambiguity of belief about an event is said to be greater, the greater the dierence between the maximum and minimum probability estimate of the event consistent with the agent's knowledge. An ambiguity averse decision maker evaluates an act by the minimum expected value that may be associated with it: the decision rule is to compute all possible expected values for each action and then choose the act which has the best minimum expected outcome. The idea being, ceteris paribus, the more an act is aected adversely by ambiguity the less its appeal to the ambiguity averse decision maker.
More formally, suppose that the DM's domain of uncertainty is the ®nite state space X fx i g N i1 . The DM chooses between acts whose payos are state contingent: e.g., a ®nancial asset zY z X X 3 RX The ambiguity averse DM's subjective belief is represented by a convex set of (standard, additive) probabilities, denoted CX The ambiguity of the belief about an event E is measured by the expression max lPC lE À min lPC lEX Like in SEU, a utility function u X R 3 RY u H Á P 0Y describes DM's attitude to risk and wealth. The DM evaluates Choquet expected utility of each act and chooses the act with the highest evaluation. The Choquet expected utility of an act is simply the minimum of all possible`standard' expected utility values obtained by measuring the contingent utilities possible from the act with respect to each of the additive probabilities in C:
To preempt misunderstandings it is emphasized that the term`ambiguity' as used in this paper, refers purely to the fuzzy perception of the likelihood subjectively associated with an event (e.g., when asked about his subjective estimate of the probability of an event, the agent replies,`It is between 50% and 60%'). It does not refer to a lack of clarity in the description of contingent events and actions. Also note, some authors and researchers refer to ambiguity variously as`vagueness', Knightian Uncertainty' or even simply as`uncertainty'. As it is used in this paper, the word uncertainty is simply the de®ning characteristic of any environment where the consequence of at least one action is not known for certain.
The Choquet expected utility of an act is just its standard expected utility calculated with respect to a`minimizing probability' corresponding to this act. Hence, in the Choquet method, the DM's appraisal is not only informed by his knowledge of the odds but is also automatically adjusted downwards to the extent it may be aected by the imprecision of his knowledge.
The design of bilateral economic contracts
Typically, economic contracts involve arrangements about contingent events. As such, the relevant trade-os hinge crucially on the likelihoods of the relevant contingencies. Hence, it is a reasonable conjecture that the domain of contractual transactions is one area of economics that is signi®-cantly aected by agents knowledge of the odds. Thus contractual relations, crucial to the organization of a modern economy, is a natural choice as a particular focus of the research on the principal economic eects of ambiguity aversion. Bilateral contracts have been a recent focus of interest to AI theorists as well [16] ; for more on this, see the work of T. Sandholm and associates, including his group's`eCommitter' project (http://ecommerce.cs.wustl.edu/ecommitter).
Economics studies mutually bene®cial exchange between individuals. The real world is dynamic and most mutually bene®cial exchange takes place over time. One party renders a good or service in the present in exchange for the promise by another to render some good or service in the future. The basic way of organizing these intertemporal exchanges is through the use of contracts. Roughly put, the contracts which are commonly traded in an economy fall into two categories: those which are used for organizing (co-ordinating) production/ consumption activity over time and those which are used for transferring (redistributing) income over time and across contingencies. The ®rst category includes all supply and delivery contracts between ®rms, between ®rms and government, between ®rms and consumers, as well as all labor contracts. The second category consists of ®nancial contracts: insurance, bonds, equities, futures and options.
The way many crucial economic institutions have developed and function is often best understood by studying the salient features of contracts and contractual relations underpinning the particular institutions. Take for instance, the ®rst of the two categories of contracts described in the preceding paragraph and the modern theory of the ®rm. Why ®rms exist and what productive processes and activities are typically integrated within the boundaries of a ®rm, are largely explained by the nature of incompleteness of supply and delivery contracts. A contract may be said to be incomplete if the contingent instructions included in the contract do not exhaust all possible contingencies. However, incompleteness of contracts has largely been a puzzle to the standard theory. This has prompted researchers in recent times to consider alternative paradigms in their search for appropriate theories of incompleteness: e.g., Mukerji [11] showed that contractual incompleteness can be explained by ambiguity aversion. This ®nding in turn explains some widely observed`realities' about the organization of ®rms that were previously dif®cult to come to terms with. The formal analysis in [11] basically involves a reconsideration of the canonical model of a vertical relationship (i.e., a relationship in which one ®rm's output is an input in the other ®rm's production activity) between two contracting ®rms under the assumption that the agents' common information about the contingent events is ambiguous and that the agents are ambiguity averse. Next, we review this exercise with a simple example.
Consider two risk neutral ®rms, B and S. B is an automobile manufacturer planning to introduce a new line of models. B wishes to purchase a consignment of car bodies (tailor-made for the new models) from SX The ®rms may sign a contract at some initial date 0 specifying the terms of trade of the sale at date 2; that is, whether trade takes place and at what price. The value of the consignment to the buyer, v, its (marginal) cost of production c, and hence, the tradeable surplus v À c, are contingent upon the state of nature realized in date 1. There are three possible contingencies x 0 Y x b Y x s Y with corresponding tradeable surpluses s 0 Y s b Y s s X After date 0 but before date 1, S invests in research for a pie that will eciently cast car bodies required for the new model while B invests eort to put together an appropriate marketing campaign for the new model. The investments aect the likelihood of realizing a particular state of nature. Each ®rm may choose between a low and a high level of investment eort. The investments are not contractible per se (i.e., it is assumed that it is not possible to draft contracts which contain perfect descriptions, veri®able ex post in courts, of the required investment eort) but the terms of trade speci®cation in the contracts may be made as contingency speci®c as required. In the case that the contract is incomplete and an`unmentioned' event arises with sure potential for surplus it is commonly anticipated by the parties that trade will be negotiated ex post and the surplus split evenly. Consider the two possibilities X and Y : X there is a longer list of reservations for the new model than for comparable makes and at a price higher than those for comparable makes; (Y) the variable cost of production of car body is low. The state of the world x 0 is characterized by the fact that both the statements are false. At x b Y X is true but not Y; conversely, at x s Y X is false but Y holds. Correspondingly suppose s 0`sb s s . The common belief about the likelihood of x b is at the margin aected (positively) more by B choosing the high investment eort over low eort than by S doing the same, while the opposite is true of x s X As is customary, we de®ne an (®rst best) ecient investment pro®le as one that would be chosen if investment eort were veri®able and contractible. 3 Bear in mind the allowance of being able to write complete contingent contracts and the institutional setting of a vertical inter-®rm relationship. As is formally argued in [11] , given all this and that decision makers are SEU maximizers, the non-veri®ability of investment will not impede eciency. In our example, for instance, a contract which distinguishes the three contingencies and sets prices that rewards B suciently higher at x b than at other contingencies (and similarly rewards S at x s ) will enforce the ®rst best eort pro®le. The general conclusion is that if agents are SEU maximizers then an incomplete contract which implements an inecient pro®le cannot be an optimal contract. 4 Such a contract can never be the optimal because it will be possible to ®nd a complete contract that dominates it (i.e., a contract that obtains higher ex ante payos for both parties). However, this conclusion is overturned if agents are ambiguity averse. The logic of this may be seen by reevaluating the above example with the sole amendment that agents are ambiguity averse. To provide sucient incentive to take the ecient investment the ex post payos in the contract have to treat the two ®rms asymmetrically at x b and x s ; for B the payo is higher at x b than at x s Y while it is the other way around for S. This implies that the ®rms would, in eect, use dierent probability distributions to evaluate their expected payos. From the set of probabilities embodying the ®rms' symmetric information B measures its 3 Some clari®cation of terminology might be useful at this point for the non-economist reader. The word pro®le is used in the same sense as in game theory; it is simply a selection of strategies, one for each player in the game. In our example, the two ®rms are mutually playing a game in which strategies are levels of (investment) eort. Eciency is a fundamental concept in economics, used as a criterion for judging the desirability of a particular allocation of resources (say, investment eort) in an economy. Roughly put, and especially in the current context, an allocation is ecient if it maximizes the total surplus for all individuals: the reference is to the size of the whole pie rather than a particular division of the pie. It is important to understand that an allocation may be individually rational, i.e., it maximizes the utility of each individual separately, taking into account the relevant constraints (e.g. individual incentives), without being ecient. For instance, in the famous Prisoners' Dilemma game, shown below, the (unique) equilibrium strategy pro®le, ConfessY Confess f g , does not allow an ecient allocation of the available payos: Not confess Confess Not confess 10,10 À10Y 11 Confess 11Y À10 0,0 payos using a probability distribution that puts a relatively higher weight on x s than the distribution S thinks prudent to check its payo against. Consequently, the sum of the expected payos will fall short of the expected total surplus ± there is a`virtual loss' of the expected surplus. It follows that if this loss' is large enough the participation constraints will break, i.e., the sharpness of incentives makes payos to each ®rm so risky that they are happier not signing on to the contract at all, thereby making such a contract impossible. An incomplete contract, say the null contract (one that leaves all allocation of contingent surplus to ex post negotiation), is not similarly vulnerable to ambiguity aversion. Such a contract will lead to a proportionate division of surplus at each contingency, implying that each ®rm will use the same probability to evaluate its payos. Additivity of the standard expectation operator then ensures that no virtual loss occurs. As is shown formally in [11] , from all this it follows that there will be parametric con®gurations for which an incomplete contract even though only implementing an inecient investment pro®le, is not dominated by any other contract. Under such circumstances the market transaction, if maintained, may justi®ably be conducted with an`inecient' incomplete contract. The`ineciency' of the market transaction would also explain why it might be abandoned in favor of vertical integration, i.e., a ®rm is instituted by integrating the upstream and downstream productive activities. Why might an explanation like the one given above be of interest? The ®nal section of [11] discusses historic instances of vertical mergers and empirical regularities about supply contracts that are understandable on the basis of ambiguity aversion, but are not well explained by`physical' transactions costs of writing contingent details into contracts. A recurrent claim among business people is that they integrate vertically because of uncertainty in input supply. This idea has always caused diculties for economists (see, for instance [2] ) who have been unable to rationalize it and have generally regarded it as misguided. The analysis in the present paper explains how the idea of ambiguity aversion provides one precise understanding of the link between uncertainty and vertical integration. Finally, at a more abstract level, a signi®cant insight obtained is that even if there were no direct costs to conditioning contractual terms on`®nely described' events, one may well end up with only`coarse' arrangements because the value of ®ne-tuning is not robust to the agents' misgivings that they have only a vague assessment of the likelihoods of the relevant`®ne' events. The understanding that how well the DM thinks he knows the relevant likelihoods explains what events are used to condition contractual instructions, is a novel contribution of the theory of ambiguity aversion to the debate about the foundations of incomplete contracts, and, the economic theory of contract design. The understanding is indeed novel, since to an SEU maximizer the quality or accuracy of his belief does not matter.
Financial contracts and ®nancial markets
In a pioneering contribution, Dow and Werlang [4] identi®ed an important implication of the CEU model with regard to optimal ®nancial decision making. The paper showed that, in a static model with one risky and one riskless asset, given ambiguous beliefs and ambiguity aversion, there will be a multiplicity of asset prices that support the optimal choice of a riskless portfolio, giving rise to what is commonly called a`bid-ask spread' (i.e., a gap between the highest price a buyer will want to bid for an asset and the minimum the seller will settle for or ask). The intuition behind this ®nding is explained in the following example.
Suppose a risk neutral investor is considering a transaction involving a unit of a ®nancial asset z with contingent payos. Speci®cally, the investor is comparing the expected payo from buying one unit of the asset to that from short selling one unit of the asset. The following table indicates the (nonadditive) probability describing the common information about the uncertainty and the contingent payos:
The expected payo of buying an unit of zY let us call it the act z b Y CEz b is obtained by taking expectations w.r.t. the relevant minimizing probability in the core of mX Notice, the payo from the act z b is lower at x L than at x H X Hence, the relevant minimizing probability when evaluating CEz b is that probability in C puts most weight on x L . Therefore,
On the other hand, the payo from going short on a unit of z (the act z s is higher at x L than at x H . In other words, buying and selling are non-comonotonic acts. Hence, the relevant minimizing probability when evaluating CE z b is that probability in C that puts most weight on x H X Thus, CEz s min lPC
0X7 Â À3 À2X4X An`economic' interpretation would run as follows. Given the ambiguity in the investor's subjective assessment of the uncertainty, more than one probability is consistent with his knowledge. Being ambiguity averse, he`shades' the valuation to the extent it may be aected by the ambiguity. The switch in the relevant minimizing probability implicit in the evaluation when comparing a buying position to a selling, is simply a re¯ection of the`shading eect'.
It is evident from our computations that if the price of the asset z were to lie in the open interval 1X8Y 2X4, then the investor would strictly prefer a zero position to either going short or buying. Unlike in the case of unambiguous beliefs (i.e., SEU) there is no single price at which to switch from buying to selling. Taking a zero position on the risky asset has the unique advantage that its evaluation is not aected by ambiguity. Thus price has to rise (fall) suciently to allow the investor feel secure in going short (long) by meeting the test of his conservative estimate ±`shading' of valuations due to ambiguity aversion is what results in the`inertia' zone. It is however important to note that Dow and Werlang's demonstration is simply a statement about optimal portfolio choice corresponding to exogenously given prices. Their result is not a description of an equilibrium since the model is not closed to obtain asset prices endogenously.
A ®nancial contract is a claim to an income stream ± hence the logic of the ®nancial markets: by exchanging such claims agents change the shapes of their income streams, obtaining a more even consumption across time and the uncertain contingencies. A ®nancial market is said to be complete if contingent payos from the dierent marketed securities are varied enough to span all the contingencies. However, in just about every ®nancial market in the real world the span is less than the full set of contingencies, i.e., the markets are incomplete. The primary implication of incompleteness is that agents may transfer income only across a limited set of contingencies and are thus left exposed to risk in a suboptimal manner. Incompleteness of ®nancial markets is a compelling feature because it explains crucial facts about the working of ®nancial and competitive markets that would be impossible to explain without assuming incompleteness. Indeed, this characteristic is the fundamental inspiration for the most comprehensive model of the market economy: general equilibrium with incomplete markets (GEI) (see [15] for a survey). Nevertheless, relatively little has been accomplished in the way of formally establishing what precisely leads to the incompleteness.
Mukerji and Tallon [12] apply ambiguity aversion to provide an explanation of the incompleteness of ®nancial markets. More particularly, the paper focuses on the question,``What prevents the typical bond-equity ®nance economy from oering sucient opportunities for Pareto optimal risk sharing? In other words, why should the theorems of general equilibrium with incomplete markets (GEI), rather than general equilibrium with complete markets (GE), be a more compelling description of the typical bond-equity economy?'' To analyze the question, the paper considers a stylized bond-equity economy, which though incomplete per se, has a rich enough set of assets available for trade such that given standard assumptions about behavior under uncertainty, the equilibrium allocation would arbitrarily approximate a complete market (GE) allocation. It is shown, however, that given`sucient' ambiguity aversion, a certain subset of the available assets will not be actually traded in equilibrium, even though available. Hence it is proved that, given sucient ambiguity aversion, provided the non-traded securities are non-redundant, equilibrium allocation of the bond-equity economy is a GEI equilibrium. This shows how ambiguity aversion may endogenously limit the scope of risk sharing obtainable through the bonds/equities actually traded in a typical economy, and therefore, explain why the actual behavior of such an economy is better described by the GEI model, rather than the GE model.
The underlying objective of the formal analysis in [12] is to identify the class of assets whose trade is vulnerable to ambiguity aversion: assets that will be traded if agents are subjective expected utility maximizers but not if the agents' common beliefs about payos of the assets is suciently ambiguous and the agents are ambiguity averse. It is found that what determines an asset's vulnerability to ambiguity aversion is whether its payos have an idiosyncratic component, i.e., if at least some component of the payo is independent of the realized endowment (which includes, primarily, wage-income payments) vector and of the payo of any other asset as well. 5 It turns out that if, (1) the range of variation of the payo's idiosyncratic component is`large' relative to the range of the variation of the component correlated with the endowment vector and, (2) the ambiguity of the agents' common belief about the idiosyncratic component is suciently high, then the asset will not be traded in any general equilibrium of the ®nance economy. Moreover, we also ®nd that the eect of idiosyncracy cannot simply be`washed away' by the standard techniques of diversi®cation relying on the laws of large numbers, as it would be if the agents' beliefs were not ambiguous.
The analysis and results in [12] suggest that if the increase in uncertainty were suciently great then trade in a certain subset of the assets will thin out (in particular, trade in those corporate bonds and forward contracts on equities for which the ratio of the range of variation of the idiosyncratic component to the range of variation due to the economic shocks is greater). History of ®-nancial markets is replete with episodes of increase in uncertainty leading to a thinning out of trade (or even seizing up completely) peculiarly in assets such as high yield corporate bonds (`junk' bonds) and bonds issued in`emerging markets' (vis., Latin America, Eastern Europe and East Asia). Also, it seems eminently demonstrable that the high risk bonds which appear to be so sensitive to attacks of uncertainty are precisely those bonds which have high idiosyncratic components in their payos. Thus the theory of ambiguity aversion 5 The presence of idiosyncratic risk re¯ects the belief that payo from a ®nancial asset is not only aected by some of the same shocks that aect individual households' endowment income and common to many assets but also by risks speci®c to each asset. While most ®rms' pro®ts are naturally aected by aggregate or sectorial demand shifts and supply shocks, other factors, more idiosyncratic to the ®rm, do typically matter. For instance, suppose a ®rm introduces a new product line, an innovation, into the market. In such a case, typically, it is not just the shocks commonly aecting ®rms in the same trade that will aect the sales of the new product but also more (brand) speci®c elements, e.g., whether (or not) the innovation has a`special' appeal for the consumers. Another example of idiosyncratic shocks, are shocks to ®rms' internal organizational capabilities.
provides an endogenously generated`natural' explanation of why only this certain class of assets, and not all assets, will be aected by the increase in uncertainty. The explanation is also useful in providing a novel understanding of the role of certain institutions of ®nancial contracting in facilitating the transaction of corporate bonds. For AI the ®ndings would be of interest to those who research the ability of securities markets to aggregate beliefs ( [13] is the pioneering work in this area, though consult Wellman's web page, cited in Section 1, for some recent applications of the idea in AI). In particular, the analysis and results in [12] suggest the aggregation may be problematic when the securities in question have idiosyncratic components, as many securities do.
Strategic decision making
In recent years game theory, the theory of strategic decision making, has come to be the basic building block of economic theorizing. Naturally, economists working with the ideas of ambiguity aversion have increasingly sought to incorporate the ideas into game theoretic analysis. While the theoretical work involved in making a success of this marriage is far from complete, there has already appeared some very innovative work in applying the newly obtained theoretical framework to explain sundry economic phenomena. In this section we review one such example.
The example relates to the theory of auctions. As is widely acknowledged, analysis of auctions is perhaps the most`public' face of game theory in economics. No less important is the fact that the principles of auction theory lie at the very heart of the theory of regulatory design, and more generally, mechanism design. Increasingly, auction theory is seen to provide important insight into the design of multiagent systems (see, apart from the citations and remarks in the introductory section, the work of Wurman (http://www.csc.ncsu.edu/ faculty/wurman/publications.html), and Sandholm (http://www.cs.wustl.edu/ $sandholm) including his group's eAuctionHouse, (http://ecommerce. cs.wustl.edu/eAuctionHouse). Traditional analysis of auctions assumes that each bidder's beliefs about opponents' valuations are represented by a probability measure. Lo [9] examines the consequences of relaxing this assumption, by allowing for ambiguous beliefs and ambiguity aversion, in the ®rst and second price sealed bid auctions where all participants are risk neutral, each bidder's valuation of the good being sold is known only to himself and is independent of others' valuations. Under a fairly general parametric speci®cation of the model it is shown that the ®rst price auction will be (strictly) preferred to the second price auction, by the seller. The result is of substantial interest, at least in part, because the traditional (SEU) analysis asserts that, given riskneutral bidders, the seller should essentially be indierent between the prospects of the two auction formats. A brief intuition of the result may be given as follows. First, recall that the essential feature of sealed bid auctions is that each bidder submits a single bid to the auctioneer and the bid is not revealed to other bidders. In the ®rst price format, the bidder who submits the highest bid wins and pays the price he bids. In a second price auction, the bidder who submits the highest bid wins but he is only required to pay a price equal to the second highest bid. As is well known, in a second price auction, irrespective of one's beliefs about others' valuations and bidding strategies, it is a (weakly) dominant strategy to bid one's true valuation. Bidding higher than one's own valuation, in a second price auction, increases the probability of winning only when the consequence is that one ends up paying a price greater than his valuation. Similarly, bidding below one's valuation is of no use: it decreases one's chances of winning when winning is gainful and does not aect the price paid in any case. However, beliefs do aect the bidding strategy in the ®rst price auction. When bidders are considering the optimal bid in the ®rst price auction, ambiguity aversion makes them behave as if it is likely that their competitors have a high valuation, thereby leading to a more aggressive bidding strategy.
All this tells that if one were to take ambiguity aversion into account then a seller should proceed to design a dierent auction mechanism than what he would given standard notions of decision making under uncertainty.
Conclusion
The research program surveyed aims to demonstrate how reformulating aspects of the decision making under uncertainty can yield very novel insights into the working of vital economic institutions such as the markets for contracts and securities. As was pointed out in Section 1, the remodeling of decision making under uncertainty drew on insights that are well-known to AI researchers since very similar considerations apply in many contexts of interest in AI problems. It is hoped that the new research in AI which proposes to draw on the lessons from analyses of market behavior of agents in uncertain environments will ®nd it of interest to note that the nature of such market interactions are aected quite signi®cantly when we consider an arguably morè realistic' (especially in AI contexts) model of decision making under uncertainty.
